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Preface 
 
 
As a student, then teacher, then teacher trainer, pedagogical researcher and mentor, I felt that 
something was missing from studies of the teaching process. A lot of attention was given to 
food for the intellect, but something was missing. The answer, of course, is that there is more 
to thinking than the intellect. In all phases of education, there has been a tendency to see 
emotions only as impediments to purposeful thought, and something to be suppressed when 
purposeful thought was practised in the classroom. The reality is that there is no thought 
without emotion and what might be loosely called our two ‘minds’, the intellectual and the 
emotional, interact. This interaction, however, is not always bad: sometimes it supports 
thinking, sometimes it makes little difference to it, and sometimes it can be – yes – bad for 
thought. Here, I illustrate some ways in which the interaction can affect the kinds of thinking 
we try to foster in students, and I suggest that we should take these effects into account in 
formal education, in initial teacher training, and in professional development in all phases of 
teaching and learning. Emotions are not something to be ignored; they are an inevitable, even 
necessary, part of human thought, and people could not function without them. There are 
enormous opportunities for educators to make the emotional labour of teaching and learning 
more efficient and more effective by developing approaches which help our students’ two 
minds work together productively. 
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Abstract 
 
An aim of this account is to show that, in teaching and learning, the intellectual system is not 
everything. Through some kinds of purposeful thought, commonly seen as worthy of 
development in the classroom and familiar to teachers, the account offers examples of how 
the emotional system can both help and hinder that thought, and, at times, be an essential part 
of it. A second aim is to illustrate, albeit briefly, that when the interaction between the two 
systems is ignored, classroom practices can act against the success of strategies intended to 
support learning and develop thinking competences. Finally, it describes how this interaction 
may be managed so that it supports teaching and learning practices. The need for further 
exploration of the classroom interaction of moods, emotions and cognition is mentioned, 
particularly where this leads to classroom strategies for its management. It is suggested that 
the interaction of the emotional and the intellectual systems should be taken into account 
when devising and testing intellectual strategies for teaching and for learning.
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1. In two minds 
 
 
Introduction 
Apollo and Dionysus were two sons of the Greek god, Zeus. Apollo was master of the 
intellect and Dionysus lived by his emotions. The intellectual system protected Apollo’s 
interests and the emotional system took care of Dionysus. For mortals, however, the two 
systems interact, often below the level of consciousness, and direct and shape thought and 
action.  This has often been seen as bad for thought. Immanual Kant (1724–1804) saw 
emotions as an illness of the mind, a threat to reason, and something to suppress. This 
tendency may be traced over two and a half millennia (e.g. Nussbaum, 2001; Oatley, 2004)1, 
and was reinforced by a belief in the supremacy of homo sapiens who was distinguished from 
other species by the presence of the intellect (Plamper, 2015). In formal education, 
proficiency in dispassionate thought is a highly prized mental ability; and so it should be, 
given its extraordinary success across the disciplines (Plamper, 2015). But, to ignore the 
interaction of moods and emotions with the intellect puts the quality of the intellect’s 
products at risk and ignores the potential of the emotional system to make a useful 
contribution. While it is clearly true that moods and emotions can hamper thought, 
particularly when they are strong, they can also facilitate it, shape it, and make it more 
productive, effectively oiling the intellect’s efforts (Newton, 2014a). Once seen as ‘fickle and 
primitive’, moods and emotions are now recognised as having a rationality of their own that 
plays an important part in managing our lives (Labouvie-Vief; 2015, p. 1). Here, I will briefly 
describe our two ‘minds’– the emotional and the intellectual systems – and point to how they 
can interact, something I will describe later in more detail, before reflecting on some 
implications for practices in formal education. 
 
The emotional system 
We commonly talk of emotions, moods, and dispositions. Emotions are relatively short-lived, 
affective responses to specific situations or events (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012). Moods 
generally last longer than emotions; they may be their after-effects or affective responses to 
the current state of well-being (e.g. Hullett, 2005). Dispositions are long-lasting, affective 
tendencies in how we respond to the world (e.g. George & Zhou, 2002). According to 
appraisal theory2 (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996), the emotional system 
quickly, automatically, and often unconsciously, appraises situations and checks them for 
what it perceives to be a benefit or a threat. If it finds one or the other, it can prompt a 
response in support of self-interest. When the situation offers some benefit, the response may 
be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure; if it seems to threaten self-interest, the feeling may 
be a painful one of anxiety or fear (e.g. Pfister & Böhm, 2008). In evolutionary terms, this 
has survival value: when confronted by a wolf, the emotional system generally prompts 
                                                          
1 Famously, David Hume, was of the view that: ‘reason is and ought to be the slave of passion’ (Hume, 
1739/1978). Some other philosophers were inclined to think similarly (see, Pickavé & Shapiro, 2012). 
2Appraisal theory has variants but these do not materially affect this account. For further information, see 
Keltner and Horberg (2015). 
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retreat – an action which clearly supports well-being. On the other hand, the sight of a friend 
is likely to prompt approach and feelings of pleasure: there is survival value in friendship. An 
appraisal of personal well-being, conscious or otherwise, may result in deep sadness at events 
of recent years, a sadness which, perhaps, prompts a career change or change of location. 
Dispositions may be innate or develop over time (or both); they behave like a homeostatic 
setting around which our affective systems operate. This account will be concerned with the 
more transient affective states associated with emotions and moods (Keltner & Lerner, 2010). 
 
It has been many millennia since physical well-being and survival were the main 
determinants of what constitutes a benefit or threat. Even 3000 years ago, what mattered in 
some cultures included self-control, hospitality, respect for elders, loyalty to friends, and 
keeping one’s word (Pomeroy et al., 2009). Change can benefit or threaten such values and 
beliefs and, as a consequence, can generate emotions. In the context of formal education, this 
happens at various levels (for example, in school, in the classroom, in the topic currently 
under study, in tests and examinations) and in personal interactions (for example, between 
students, between the teacher and student). A forthcoming test, for instance, can produce a 
disabling anxiety. Similarly, students often value how others perceive them and may be 
intensely embarrassed by having to demonstrate a skill. But not all emotions impede thought. 
Interest – the pleasurable anticipation of something of personal value – is motivating and 
prompts approach and engagement with a task. Emotional responses can also offer 
information about the progress of thought. A line of thought that promises to be fruitful can 
produce pleasure and encourage persistence.  
 
Of course, students not only experience emotions while they try to learn but also bring moods 
and emotions with them. These can affect their thinking. Someone may arrive at the 
classroom feeling irritated, for instance. On engaging with the task, the irritation may be 
taken to indicate that the line of thought is ineffective and should be abandoned. Another 
student might arrive feeling mildly happy and engage creatively and willingly with the task. 
These are only a few of the effects which moods and emotions can have on thought (Forgas, 
1995). They can hinder it, enhance it, and covertly shape it, often unconsciously. It is 
important to note that the processes of the emotional system are not, in themselves, 
‘irrational’: the system simply takes as given those things that matter to someone, and then 
weighs events and situations against them. If what matters is sound, then the response may 
offer useful information. 
 
The intellectual system 
The conscious, emotionless processing of information is a matter for the intellectual system. 
Of course, much of the mind’s processing is unconscious although important conscious 
management and processing takes place in what has been called working memory (Johnson-
Laird, 2010). The intellectual system is generally much slower than the emotional system but 
its deliberations are potentially open to reflection and scrutiny. The American philosopher, 
Charles Sanders Peirce reminded us that we think for a purpose (see Poggiani, 2012). In the 
classroom, a lot of effort goes into exercising various kinds of purposeful thought, that is, 
thinking aimed at particular ends. It includes, for example, reasoning (as in the production of 
a valid statement from premises (Wagner & Penner, 1984)); understanding (as in the 
construction of relationships to form a coherent whole (Newton, 2012a); creative thinking 
(constructing novel mental products with a ‘rightness-of-fit’ for the situation, and preferably 
well-crafted and parsimonious (Glück et al, 2002; Newton, 2010a; Newton, 2013)); decision-
making (choosing a prudent, promising course of action (e.g. Staudinger & Glück, 2011)); 
and evaluating the products of thought in order to produce a position on their quality or 
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trustworthiness (Newton, 2014a). These kinds of thought are not, of course, mutually 
exclusive; what distinguishes them is their purpose and an essential presence of thought that 
is characteristic of that purpose and gives it its name. Developing competence in kinds of 
purposeful thought like these is often seen as worthwhile, and the concepts are a part of 
classroom life and educational discourse in all phases of education (e.g. Harman, 2011)3. It 
makes practical sense, therefore, to look at the interaction of emotions and the intellect in 
terms of these kinds of thought, drawing out matters of relevance for teaching and learning.  
 
The interaction of the intellectual and emotional systems 
An event, such as a classroom activity, is perceived and the information transmitted to both 
the intellectual and emotional systems (figure 1.1). On reaching the emotional system, it is 
quickly appraised or evaluated for its relevance to matters of personal consequence, concern 
or vested interest. If one is perceived, its presence and nature (for or against) produces a rapid 
response. Substances are released into the blood stream which initiate and support that 
response, and produce feelings we associate with, for instance, anger, annoyance, frustration, 
disappointment, curiosity, happiness, joy, and euphoria. In the meantime, the intellectual 
system processes the information, but often more slowly. Its interpretation may contradict the 
emotional system’s concerns, so the feelings may fade. If it agrees with the appraisal, it may, 
of course, reinforce the response. Sometimes, the emotional system may not perceive a matter 
of consequence until the intellectual system has thought it through. A growing realisation of a 
threat or benefit then spreads to the emotional system and produces feelings like those 
described above. At times, the intellectual system engages with the situation and finds a way 
of alleviating the threats or turning them to advantage; negative emotions and responses are 
then likely to subside.  
   External               Internal 
 
                The Intellectual System 
    
     Events                           Perception                                    Reactions/Responses 
                                                Attention       
    
                The Emotional System 
 
 
Figure 1.1: A model of a student’s dual system for maintaining well-being: events are perceived, 
attended to, and judged for bearing upon goals, beliefs and values, leading to responses. The depicted 
overlap of the various systems is intended to indicate that, in neurological terms, they are not entirely 
separate. The emotional processing of information, however, may be privileged (LeBlanc et al., 
2014).  
 
                                                          
3This may bring to mind the notion of ‘critical thinking’. ‘Critical thinking’ has diverse definitions (see, e.g. 
Moseley et al., 2005). For some, it includes all ‘good’, purposeful thought or a general inclination towards 
‘constructive doubt’ (e.g. Halpern, 1998; Hare, 2001). In this account, however, it is important to be more 
specific about particular kinds of thought: moods and emotions do not interact in the same way with all of them. 
At the same time, teachers, and the documents which direct their work, are specific about the expected kinds of 
purposeful thought, using terms like those used here, so what will be described may be related directly to 
teaching discourse and practice.  
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An encounter with a particular learning task may activate emotions which shape thought 
during the task (the so-called integral effect). At the same time, moods and emotions 
generated elsewhere are often brought to a task and these may have an effect on task-related 
thought (also known as incidental effects) (Forgas, 1995).  
 
Elephants in the classroom 
The interaction of emotions and the intellect in education has not received as much attention 
as might be expected (e.g. Adler & Obstfeld, 2007). John Dewey (1859–1952) is an early, 
partial exception in that he valued what emotions could do for motivation (e.g. Dewey, 1916). 
Piaget (1954/1981) similarly saw affect as ‘energizing’ and ‘regulating’ the intellect, using 
the analogy that affect (taken broadly to include the will or conation) is like the gasoline 
which activates an automobile engine: without gasoline, the engine does not function, and 
without emotion, there is no thought. He also believed that just as the gasoline does not 
modify the engine, emotions do not modify the intellect, although they can make it falter or 
stall. Recent studies, however, show that the emotions do more than activate the intellect: 
they can shape its processes and radically affect its products. Pekrun et al. (2002) have 
concluded that emotions in the classroom bear upon motivation, learning strategies, cognitive 
resources, self-regulation, and academic achievement. Such studies led Immordino-Yang and 
Damasio (2007) to point out that disregarding this interaction is a serious omission in 
education. Like it or not, teaching (and learning) is emotional labour and this needs to be 
recognised in planning and in teaching (Fried, 2011). Educational institutions are places 
where people and learning interact: people with people, and people with events. Threats to 
and benefits for vested interests abound, and have the potential to produce all manner of 
moods and emotions. Research on how to exercise the intellect and enhance the quality of 
cognition extends over a century and has rightly found its way into the classroom. Teachers 
consciously adopt specific activities because they know they exercise particular kinds of 
purposeful thought. But the moods and emotions which bear upon that thought generally 
receive little attention, other than, perhaps, in an attempt at generating interest. What is 
known about the interaction of the mind’s two systems has yet to find its way into conscious 
planning for efficient and effective thinking (Newton, 2014a). Moods and emotions may still 
be ignored or dismissed as annoying obstacles to thought and learning. But these moods and 
emotions are still there and have their way with each student’s cognition. The ‘elephant in the 
room’ is an idiom in English which refers to something clearly present but ignored as though 
it did not exist. Moods and emotions seem to be elephants in the classrooms: we know they 
exist but choose to ignore them or, at best, suppress them (Newton, 2014b). Instead, these 
elephants need to be recognised, discussed and put to good use. 
Describing moods and emotions 
Before continuing, a note about how moods and emotions tend to be grouped may be useful. 
They may, for instance, be grouped by hedonic tone or valence (positive, e.g. joy; negative, 
e.g. sadness), strength (moderate, e.g. apprehension; strong, e.g. terror), activation 
(activating, e.g. anger; deactivating, e.g. serenity), by an approach or avoidance impulse (an 
urge to approach, e.g. interest; an urge to avoid, e.g. anxiety), and by some combination of 
these (e.g. strength and tone, or activation and tone, simultaneously – note, however, that 
strength is often implied in the term, as in happy versus ecstatic, and annoyance versus rage). 
Some theorists prefer to treat each mood or emotion as essentially discrete and different in 
effect. For practical purposes, it can be useful to describe moods and emotions in different 
ways in different contexts. (For further elaboration, see, e.g., Baas et al. (2008), Leblanc et al. 
(2014), Pekrun and Linnenbrink-Garcia (2014).)  
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2. Emotions and engagement with purposeful thought 
 
 
Introduction 
I will begin with the phenomenon of engagement with purposeful thinking in formal 
education. Why do people do it? That emotions can motivate engagement and stimulate 
thought with events is well known. As already mentioned, it was central to Dewey’s thinking 
about motivation in education. Since he felt the need to make it explicit, it may be that the 
teachers he observed did not give it much conscious attention at that time but, perhaps, this is 
less so now. Nevertheless, I will summarize the role of the emotional system in prompting 
engagement in purposeful thought and learning. To use Piaget’s analogy, this is about the 
energizing effects of the gasoline in the engine. The gasoline can, however, be of the wrong 
kind, and then the engine stalls. Being motivated to engage must be contrasted with what is, 
for some people, a very powerful motive to disengage, namely, an expectation that their 
thoughts, skills and knowledge will have to be demonstrated or exposed in what I call ‘public 
performance’. For these students, the prospect of public performance fills them with dread 
and may even prompt a panic-stricken withdrawal. First studied in the context of language 
learning, it extends to all areas of the curriculum where some form of public performance, 
interpreted broadly, is expected.  
These two phenomena will serve to illustrate a general, but contrasting, approach-avoidance 
effect of emotions on motivation to engage with purposeful thinking. In later parts, I turn to 
those occasions when the gasoline’s effects are more selective.  
Motivation and engagement  
Motivation is what more or less activates and sustains engagement with a learning activity 
(Reeve, 2001). Intrinsic motivation is generated by activities which seem to offer the 
satisfaction of personal psychological needs. It may come from a belief that the activity has 
the potential to satisfy, for example, a need to feel competent, to make sense of the world, to 
feel secure, to have control of events, or to explore and satisfy curiosity (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
With extrinsic motivation, however, learning is instrumental in obtaining external rewards. 
Examples would be engaging with learning to obtain good grades in order to access a 
particular career, make parents proud, obtain material rewards, avoid punishment, or do better 
than a sibling (Newton, 1988). 
 
There are various kinds of engagement with learning. In the classroom, intellectual 
engagement involving purposeful thought is generally what is expected, but it may also 
involve behavioural and physical engagement, for instance, to ward off boredom or 
experience some property or effect directly (Fletcher, 2005). Of particular relevance here is 
the emotional engagement in which a teacher tries to generate and attach rewarding emotions 
to the subject in order to make it a source of pleasure and to encourage further, intellectual 
engagement.  
10 
 
Such emotions can be shaped by the emotional behaviours of others. For instance, a teacher’s 
enthusiasm is known to attract attention and engagement, increase on-task interaction with a 
topic, and lead to enhanced recall (Frenzel et al., 2009; Moé; 2015). It is as though the 
teacher’s enthusiasm suggests to the student that the topic offers some satisfaction of a 
personal need (Newton, 2014a). Immediacy behaviour – when teachers reduce the physical 
and psychological distance between themselves and the students by, for example, moving 
amongst them in a relaxed way – can enhance students’ mental ease, confidence, and learning 
(Richmond et al., 1987). Self-disclosure, when teachers (selectively and with moderation) 
reveal something about themselves that is relevant to the topic in hand, can have a similar 
effect (e.g. Downs et al., 1988). Such behaviours can make the emotional climate of a 
classroom (the collective, affective tone of the teacher and students) more conducive to 
engagement and learning (Brackett et al., 2011; Newton, 2014a). The importance of fostering 
a willing involvement in learning activities has given rise to pedagogies of engagement which 
consciously employ ways of motivating students (e.g. Mestre, 2005).  
 
This illustrates that emotions arising from the promise of personal benefit, if strong enough, 
can activate motivation and engagement with thinking and learning broadly. But emotions 
can also impede engagement for some students, as is illustrated by the effect of emotions 
produced when students have to perform. 
 
Performance emotions 
Performance – demonstrating learning, skill, or ability publically – can be stressful because it 
is a threat to a student’s public-image and self-esteem. It may be immediate, even unexpected 
(as when a student is called upon to answer a question or carry out a task in the presence of 
others), it may be initially private (as when the student sits a high-stakes examination) but has 
material consequences which affect, for instance, the achievement of a goal, such as a 
preferred career. 
 
Most students want others to think well of them. Responding to a question in class has the 
potential to make a student look foolish, and so it threatens the student’s self and public 
image. Not everyone reacts strongly to such a common classroom event but those who do can 
be so overwhelmed by it that they become embarrassed, tongue-tied, and unable to recall 
what they know, or to reason with it. For example, they become unable to construct rhymes 
and recall names. Crozier and Hostettler (2003) noted that such impediments can, 
collectively, adversely affect school grades. This effect has been fairly well described in the 
context of second language learning where emotions like embarrassment, anxiety, and 
shyness, have been called ‘affective filters’ or blocks to spoken language expertise (Er, 2015; 
Krashen, 1988; MacIntyre & Devaele, 2014). The feelings can be so intense that memory of 
their specific cause can last a life-time: one 8-year-old child whose second language was 
English, slipped into her first language in her haste to express herself and was laughed at by 
the class. She still recalled what was, for her, an intensely disagreeable event after some four 
decades (Swain, 2013). Adverse performance emotions are not, of course, confined to 
language learning but can occur in any subject where the student must perform in public. 
Emotions can effectively block their performance through a kind of stage fright; students 
come to dread a lesson, dislike the subject, and may drop it as soon as possible (Horwitz, 
2010).  
 
Tests or examinations can be a threat to a student’s public and self-image but also to 
cherished goals which directly determine subsequent events, such as entry to a particular 
course, training, or career (He, 2013). When this is the case, they tend to be referred to as 
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‘high stakes tests’ (Pekrun, 2006). While a little anxiety can enhance performance, strong 
anxiety reduces it, as shown in the well-known, inverted U graph (figure 2.1). The aim is to 
have each student perform at the peak of the graph where the anxiety is just sufficient to 
make them focus on the task and treat it seriously. 
 
                                                 high 
 
 
 
                        Performance 
 
 
 
 
                                                  low 
                                                          low          Anxiety             high 
 
Figure 2.1: The effect of anxiety in performance 
 
Pekrun and his colleagues (Perkun et al., 2009) identified anticipatory anxiety, occurring 
before the test, situational anxiety, occurring during the test, and outcome or consequence 
anxiety, occurring after the test (figure 2.2). Anticipatory anxiety can interfere with 
preparation for the test (and can be caused by a lack of effective preparation or putting off 
that preparation). As the test date approaches, it tends to increase. A high level of self-
efficacy (a belief in a capacity to prepare effectively for such events) can alleviate anxiety 
(Cismas, 2009). Situational anxiety is reduced by knowledge of the test format and test 
procedures and by extensive practice before the event (Stipeck, 2002). Outcome and 
consequence anxiety grow as the date of the test result approaches (Putwain et al., 2010). 
They may be lessened by discussing possible actions if the worst happens (Newton, 2014a).  
 
                                           Before                   The Test         After                        Post test result                 
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Figure 2.2: Anxiety before, during and after a high-stakes test: denser shading indicates increased 
anxiety felt by some students.  
These serve to illustrate that, on the one hand, emotions can initiate and sustain purposeful 
thought, and, on the other, they can very effectively obstruct it. 
 
In practice 
Given the value of creating positive motivation in students, it is not surprising to find it listed 
amongst indicators of ‘good’ or ‘best’ practice in teaching. In all phases of education and all 
subjects of the curriculum, teachers are often urged to arouse curiosity and generate interest 
by relating topics to the students’ world, develop competence and self-efficacy, offer 
affiliation using collaborative educational games, and provide autonomy in learning (e.g. 
Denis & Jouelot, 2005; Rasinen, Virtanen & Ikonen, 2012; Ladson-Billings, 1997; Sanders, 
2012). Nevertheless, the frequency of articles which refer to motivation in practice suggests 
that it is not always easy to plan for or achieve. In part, this may be due to the wide spread of 
students’ interests and concerns so that what motivates one student leaves another unmoved. 
Values, goals and beliefs also change with time and place so that particular approaches can 
become anachronistic, and may not be transferable between cultures.  
 
The effect of emotions on certain kinds of performance, like speaking a foreign language, has 
also received some attention. But, at the same time, teachers are reminded that trying to 
transmit knowledge to passive students is not always the best way to foster learning (e.g. 
Straits & Wilke, 2007). As a consequence, they may do their best to make learning active and 
participatory. Unfortunately, this can be counter-productive for those students who are easily 
embarrassed, have stage-fright, or feel overly anxious as they wait their turn for public 
interrogation. This can be made worse by teachers who allow little time for thought, correct 
errors immediately as they are made, and interact in ways perceived to be discouraging and 
Pre-test days: 
Anticipatory 
emotions 
During the test:  
Situational emotions 
Waiting for 
the result: 
Outcome 
emotions 
After the result: 
Consequence 
emotions 
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lacking in empathy (Zarrinabadi, 2014). Active participation, however, really means mental 
participation and need not begin with public performance (Newton, 2012a). Digital 
technology may be able to offer some respite for the student by acting as a surrogate teacher 
and enabling private performance while still keeping the teacher informed of progress (e.g. 
Evans, 2009). It is important that teachers do not use teaching strategies without 
discrimination, whatever success has been claimed for them – what suits a student of one 
temperament may not suit another of a different temperament (Rothbart, 2012). Teachers who 
put their faith in broad generalizations about fostering thinking and learning may find 
themselves thwarted by individual differences. 
 
Formal examinations are often unavoidable experiences but students can be prepared for 
them. Unfortunately, reminding students that everything hangs on the test is not the best way 
of allaying excessive test anxiety (Newton, 2016). Students may need strategies for 
examination preparation and frequent practice to increase confidence and desensitize them to 
examinations. Providing formative feedback is widely recommended as a worthwhile way of 
bringing about change in students’ thinking and performance.  Once again, it can be a double-
edged sword as it can also make students drop-out (Race, 1995). Young (2000) found, in his 
aptly titled study, ‘I Might as Well Give Up’, that the scrutiny of performance can demolish 
self-esteem, especially amongst mature students. Some see what they do as, ‘only work’, but, 
for a few, a sense of self is at stake.  
 
I now turn to the more subtle effects of moods and emotions on particular groups of 
purposeful thought. 
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3. Methodical and constructive thought 
 
Introduction 
Clearly, emotions can affect thinking as a whole, but the emotional system also has effects 
that are specific to particular kinds of thought. Some kinds of thought have much in common 
and may be loosely grouped into families. Two will serve to illustrate contrasting effects.  
 
Methodical thought is one such family, characterised by a relatively strong presence of 
analytical, logical, reasoned, rigorous, systematic or step-by-step processing of information 
(Newton, 2015). Deductive reasoning, a process of logical inferencing to produce a 
conclusion from given premises or conditions, is an example (Colman 2003). Although 
classroom mathematics, the sciences, and philosophy tend to be seen as archetypes of this 
kind of thought, it is by no means confined to these. The evaluation of mental and other 
products to test their match with claims, aims, or criteria is another kind of purposeful 
thought which normally involves at least careful, systematic thought. For instance, this is 
commonly expected when technology students have to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
potential solution to a technological problem. Again, evaluation is often expected in other 
areas of the curriculum. Regardless of mood and emotion, methodical thought is fallible 
because people have limited mental capacity to hold and manipulate variables, to apply and 
sustain mental effort, and to construct and explore alternatives (Johnson-Laird, 2010). It often 
calls for an analysis of ideas, and the careful thinking through and checking of a chain of 
reason. It can also suffer from bias. For instance, the evaluation of a research report can be 
subject to the prevailing climate of criticism (which tends to be negative in the West), bias 
against novelty, bias towards the confirmation of a reviewer’s beliefs, opposition to what 
challenges those beliefs, and, surprisingly, a favouring of obscure exposition (Newton, 
2010b). The process of making an inference (if this is true, then it follows that this must also 
be true) can be supported with questions that direct attention to what matters, and prompt or 
guide students to adopt a careful, systematic approach (Newton, 2012a). Having students 
work together can also support methodical evaluation, perhaps because collectively, the 
students’ mental skills are greater than those of one student alone (Gokhale, 1995).  
 
Constructive thought is another family of purposeful thought, characterised by a relatively 
strong presence of connection-making, relationship-finding, or imaginative synthesis to fuse 
information, knowledge and ideas into meaningful, coherent wholes (Newton, 2012a). 
Understanding, a much valued outcome of education, is an example. In the constructivist 
paradigm, it involves mentally building models of aspects of the physical and mental world 
(Johnson-Laird, 2010). Often, the teacher wants students to make connections which reflect 
those generally approved by the discipline’s community, but, in some contexts, the teacher 
will encourage more idiosyncratic, personal understandings (Newton, 2012a). In creative 
thinking, for example, the emphasis is on constructing personal ‘understandings’ through 
what is commonly called imagination, the connecting of seemingly unrelated, dissimilar, or 
mentally distant pieces of information and ideas. These personal constructions may, more or 
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less tentatively, express something about the world, or solve a problem. From this 
perspective, understanding, creative thinking, inventing and problem solving, have something 
in common, and show an increasing emphasis on novelty (at least for the student) as 
understanding becomes creative thinking. Understanding and kinds of creative thinking are 
often expected in many areas of the curriculum (Newton, 2012b). To support understanding, 
teachers may have students recall and develop prior knowledge and draw attention to what is 
to be connected. One strategy is ‘forced prediction’ where students are asked to predict what 
will happen next or in certain, given circumstances. To answer meaningfully, they must 
construct a mental model and manipulate it appropriately (Newton, 2012a). To be creative, 
students may need to explore the situation or problem and tentatively try mental connections 
in an informed way (Newton, 2012b). 
 
This is not, of course, to say that these examples of purposeful thought from the classroom 
cannot also involve other kinds of thought, but, to the extent that they exercise thought that is 
methodical or constructive, they can illustrate some contrary influences of moods and 
emotions.  
 
Careful, methodical thought 
It will not be surprising to find that strong emotions generally impede methodical thought. 
They tend to take up mental resources and, as a consequence, what is meant to be careful, 
focused thought becomes erratic, inefficient, less thorough, and, hence, more prone to error 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Depression, with its tendency to dwell on the past and revisit 
unhappy experiences, also tends to distract the mind from the task in hand and displaces on-
task methodical thought (Martin & Kerns, 2011; Stollstorff et al., 2013). But, at the same 
time, some positive moods, like a state of joy, tend to lower performance in the systematic 
reasoning processes of deduction. Such positive moods tend to encourage a broader kind of 
thinking which avoids detailed processing and engages better with generalities than with 
particulars (Blanchette & Richards, 2010).  
 
Calm and mildly negative moods, like feeling a little sad, however, can support methodical 
thought and systematic reasoning. They help the mind focus attention on details, and take 
pains over analysis, often essential in deduction and evaluation. As a result, those feeling sad 
are likely to take fewer moves to solve a logical puzzle than happy people (Badcock & Allen, 
2003). When evaluation is called for, someone in a happy mood can overlook errors and non-
sequiturs that they would otherwise note if they were in a sad mood (Strain et al., 2012). 
Systematic thought needs, as Andrews and Thompson (2009, p. 620) have put it, ‘analytical 
rumination’, which makes ‘feeling blue’ somewhat useful at times. Systematic reasoning is 
likely to be sounder when in a slightly negative frame of mind. Subdued, somewhat sad 
moods tend to reduce distraction and focus attention on detail. 
 
Carefree, constructive thought  
Moderately positive moods, like being happy, tend to support the noticing of patterns, 
connections and relationships, that is, the construction of understandings and their application 
in new situations (Clore & Palmer, 2009; Um et al., 2012). It seems that feeling moderately 
happy suggests to the would-be thinker that the situation is safe to explore and allows mental 
resources to seek connections and construct explanations. It is as though there is a mental 
relaxation which, according to Fredrickson and Branigan (2005), supports a broaden-and-
build mode of thought. Moreover, if understanding is slow to develop, happy people are more 
likely to widen their thinking and search for additional information to support the process 
(Gaspar & Zawadzki, 2012). The broaden-and-build mode of thought is especially well-
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suited to creative thinking, problem solving, and invention because it encourages flexible 
thinking, experimentation, ‘playing’ with ideas, and ‘what if’ thinking (e.g. Fredrickson, 
2004). Negative moods, however, can reduce the sensation of mental safety and narrow 
attention, at times inhibiting creative thought. However, in a long task, those who are happy 
may be less persistent than those who are sad and can be less critical of potential solutions 
(Schwartz & Clore, 2003). In addition, intense positive emotions like ecstasy may also 
obstruct constructive thought. 
 
These specific and opposing effects of moods and emotions on purposeful thought may be 
something teachers accommodate in the flow of their teaching, but they may not be a matter 
for planning and forethought about lessons. Depending on the kind of thought and the 
prevailing moods and emotions, teaching strategies can, in practice, be counterproductive and 
even self-defeating.  
 
In practice 
These two, loose families, largely distinguished by their essential kinds of thought, are 
unlikely to be mutually exclusive in practice. As the train of thought shifts from one mode to 
another, helpful moods and emotions may become hindering moods and emotions, and vice 
versa. For instance, creative thinking, problem solving, or inventing may, at some point, call 
for an evaluation of ideas. Constructive, inventive thought can benefit from a moderately 
happy frame of mind but evaluation is probably better in a more neutral or even sad frame. If 
evaluation is initiated too soon, it could stifle creative thought. Those who try to blend the 
two kinds of thought may end up with no ideas to evaluate. (Some students may be 
predisposed to do this anyway and abandon an idea before its potential has been explored. 
There can be times when it is useful to suppress destructive doubt, and suspend disbelief.) 
Creative thought can also be stifled by urgency. When time is short, teachers may continually 
press students to complete the task. It can make the prevailing mood negative enough to 
curtail constructive thought and defeat the purpose of the activity. This suggests that shifting 
between and blending or integrating families of thought may need careful handling. In 
particular, the stream of affect needs to be managed, or the sequence of kinds of thought 
adjusted to suit the flow of affect (Newton, 2010a).  
 
Popularly, being happy is seen as the ‘correct’ state of mind (at least in the West). 
Accordingly, experience in formal education is assumed to be good if students are ‘happy’ in 
their work. If this means forever striving for a state of continuous euphoria then it would 
defeat purposeful thought. Even striving to make students perpetually joyful might do little 
for the productivity of methodical thought when a quiet, contented mood would be better.  
Temporary dysphoria is a part of life and, it has been argued, has evolved because it serves a 
useful function in signalling that there is something about a person’s well-being which needs 
attention. Moderately negative moods can focus attention, reduce false memories, improve 
judgment, reduce gullibility, reduce stereotyping, increase fairness, and make interpersonal 
interaction less likely to cause offence. In addition, moods and emotions can offer 
information so that they indicate when a train of thought seems to be unproductive and, 
hence, prompt the thinker to try a different approach. Conversely, positive feelings can 
indicate that the train of thought is making progress (Newton, 2014). In other words, moods 
and emotions, including the unpleasant ones, can be adaptive in some circumstances (see, for 
instance, Forgas, 2013). In short, as Frijda (2004) has put it, the mind has not evolved for 
happiness but for survival, and emotions, both positive and negative, can usefully serve that 
end.  
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Pedagogical research has identified ways of exercising the intellect but has tended to ignore 
the potentially confounding effects of the emotional system. We need to know under what 
conditions strategies are at their best. There is also a need to recognize that generalizations, at 
least about thinking and learning, have to be hedged with qualifications, limitations and 
conditions: students vary and, in this context, this means in the nature and intensity of their 
incidental and integral moods and emotions. One kind of lesson does not suit everyone and 
individual differences need to be planned for. Research now needs to turn to ways of bringing 
the two systems together in mutually supportive ways and to disseminate the findings 
amongst teachers at all stages of education. There is, however, another role of the emotional 
system in purposeful thinking, one which will be exemplified by the process of decision-
making.  
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4: Decision-making 
 
Introduction 
I now turn to a kind of purposeful thought which is, arguably, the most important as it can 
determine the trajectory of someone’s life: decision-making (e.g. Kaufman, 2009; Milbank, 
1996). Decision-making is the selection of an action (mental or physical) from alternatives 
(including the option of inaction) to achieve a goal (e.g. Beyer, 1991). The process of 
decision-making can involve both methodical and constructive thought so it is open to the 
same effects of moods and emotions as they are. This is not, however, at the centre of interest 
here. Instead, attention will be on emotional responses which narrow or select from an 
otherwise wide field of choices and offer information about options which may facilitate the 
decision. Decision-making is a kind of purposeful thought where the emotions do more than 
pour oil or throw sand on the cogs of the intellect: they can take an active part in the decision-
making process. Decisions, of course, may also affect others, so they can be fraught events 
which call for a careful consideration of consequences. The development of proficiency in 
decision-making offers support for an effective and considerate navigation of life’s demands 
and opportunities (de Swardt, 1998), and UNESCO sees it as a basic learning need of the 
twenty-first century (Delors, 1996). Here, I will describe potentially enabling roles for the 
emotional system in personal decision-making and comment on some educational practices. 
 
Personal decisions and emotions 
Models of decision-making can give the impression that the exercise is a purely intellectual 
one of computation to find the logically best alternative. Once again, there is more to 
decision-making than the intellect (Kahneman, 1991). Note, for instance, how many people 
ask themselves how they feel about a particular opportunity.  
 
How do I feel about it? 
The emotional system evaluates situations for what it perceives to be threats and benefits to 
matters of personal consequence. Matters of personal consequence include values. Values can 
be seen as beliefs and goals to which some personal importance is attached. Someone may 
value family relationships for the security they bring and want to maintain them. In the 
process, the means of maintaining contact with the family has instrumental value. Even when 
the goal is avoidance, what avoidance offers is perceived as more valuable than what 
acceptance brings. Values may also amount to ideals, as when believing that compassion, 
honesty and reliability are personally important. We may also value our self-image and the 
judgments others make of us so we seek to defend and promote them. Goals are similarly 
valued ends which we pursue, as when striving to enter a particular career. In the process, 
success in examinations that make it possible becomes valued. Many matters of personal 
consequence are acquired informally, often in childhood from family, friends, the media, and 
experience. These become so well-integrated in the mind that they may sink below the level 
of awareness and direct actions without being readily open to scrutiny. Some matters of 
consequence, when in competition, have priority over others, but priority can be a matter of 
expedience (Jary & Jary, 1995). For instance, some theology students who valued 
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selflessness ignored someone seeking help as they hurried to an examination (e.g. Harman, 
2009). Values may also change with time. For example, Pinker (2011) showed that life is 
more highly valued in the West than it once was. Patriotism, on the other hand, is a value 
which tends to wax and wane. Given the need to solve the same problems of living together, 
it is not surprising to find some values common to diverse cultures. Schwartz (1994) found 
that achievement, power, benevolence, tolerance, security, conformity, and excitement were 
valued in many societies (although not always to the same degree).  
 
When the decision-maker reflects upon options, the emotional system quickly sets them 
against such values, and generates emotions reflecting threats or benefits to them. These 
emotions vary in strength and hedonic tone. The decision-maker notices them as ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ feelings of an intensity which reflects the magnitude of the threat or benefit. This may 
then prompt acceptance, rejection or indifference to the options. Just because it comes from 
the emotional system, it does not mean that the judgment process itself is necessarily 
irrational. The emotional system takes the decision-maker’s values, beliefs and goals as 
givens and weighs the options against them. Given that values, beliefs and goals are often 
only partly conscious, the information offered by emotional responses is potentially useful in 
quickly filtering options that are unacceptable and highlighting those that are welcome (or 
unwelcome). It is as though the emotional system expedites decision-making by focusing on 
what matters to the decision-maker, weighing often disparate values, and quickly responding 
with: This is how you feel about it (Pfister & Böhm, 2008). In this way, the emotional system 
provides ‘a rudder to guide judgment and action’ (Immordino-Yang & Damasio (2007, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, the rudder is only as good as the decision-maker’s values, beliefs and goals, 
some of which may be ill-founded, maladaptive, or unacceptable to the host society (Haselton 
& Ketelaar, 2006).  
 
Mistaken information 
Unfortunately, moods and emotions may be brought to decision-making from elsewhere and 
mistaken for the answer to: ‘How do I feel about it?’ Imported feelings of happiness, for 
instance, may be taken to indicate that a particular option benefits the decision-maker. This 
can lead to incautious, reckless decisions or, at least, slow the process while imported 
emotions are differentiated from those generated by the options (Newton, 2015; 
Scheibehenne & von Helversen, 2015). At times, other people’s emotional responses, 
reflecting their own enthusiasm or caution, can also be substituted for an uncertain response 
by the decision-maker, sometimes unwisely dispelling uncertainty and doubt (Parkinson & 
Simons, 2009).  
 
Wise decision-making 
Decisions vary in how much they are of concern to the decision-maker but also in how much 
they affect others.  Figure 4.1 depicts a simple division of such decisions to illustrate the 
point. In quadrant A, decisions are of little personal consequence to the decision-maker and to 
others. (Perhaps the choice of a coffee mug from a collection of similar mugs might fall in 
this category.) In quadrant B, decisions matter to the decision-maker but not much to others. 
(At times, which sweater to buy is an example.) In quadrant C, the decision matters greatly to 
someone else but may be of little long-term consequence to the decision-maker. (The gaol 
sentence passed by a judge may be an instance.) In quadrant D, the decision matters a lot to 
the self and another person. (Deciding to accept employment in a distant city could greatly 
affect a spouse and the children.) In reality, of course, the quadrants do not do justice to the 
rich and personal nature of decisions and values: the variables are continuous so sharp 
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boundaries do not exist, and only the decision-maker can know how much something is 
valued – even a coffee mug may have sentimental value for someone. 
 
   HIGH 
     
  
 
 Of concern to the 
  decision-maker 
 
    
    a 
 
 
 
   NONE           HIGH    
  Of concern to others 
 
Figure 4.1: A simplified view of the personal decision space according to the perceived personal 
consequences of a decision. 
Not only are decision makers’ lives determined by their decisions, often irrevocably, but so 
are those of others. Many societies expect decision-makers to show an awareness of this, and 
to factor this into their decision-making so that decisions do not unnecessarily threaten the 
well-being and freedom of others, recognizing that people must live together relatively 
harmoniously. This can call for some empathy on the part of the decision-maker, and it also 
calls for a willingness to recognise the information offered by the emotional system, and to 
interrogate its basis.  
 
In practice 
We make an enormous number of decisions in a lifetime and we may learn from that 
experience but competence may not be high and may not use information on offer to its best 
advantage. Competence in this valuable life skill may, however, be developed through 
practice (Beyer, 1991). Nevertheless, having a choice is not always welcome; decisions are 
avoided or become anxious, unhappy events. Particular mental states, like depression and the 
rumination associated with it, can impede decision-making and lead to a lack of confidence in 
the choice, should one be achieved (Van Randenborgh & Jong-Meyer, 2010).  
 
There is a history of teaching about decision-making, particularly for use in the workplace 
(e.g. in medicine, business, and in the making of military strategy). In such contexts, 
decision-making may be seen largely as an intellectual exercise (Slovic et al., 2005). The 
model of Weiss et al. (2009) gauges the value of each outcome, its likelihood and salience, 
and, hence, identifies the option with the maximum utility. In effect, the arithmetic indicates 
the best course of action. Applying this intellectual process to personal decision-making is 
often not feasible as probabilities may not be readily quantifiable, and there is rarely the time, 
ability, or inclination to engage in processing them (Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Disregarding 
the emotional system ignores its processing capabilities, risks overlooking unconscious 
values, and may produce decisions which are inappropriate for the decision-maker. The 
emotional system may offer help by producing ‘inclinations for action that, in a given 
situation, most adequately serve current strivings’, something which is popularly referred to 
as intuition (Zeelenberg et al., 2008, p. 24).  
 
    
 B          D  
 
 A          C  
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To support the teaching of decision-making, the ‘informed intuition’ model of Thagard 
(2001) allows this intuition to be the final arbiter in the decision-making process. According 
to Thagard, people should consciously inform the process of decision-making by clarifying 
the situation and then arrive at an intuitive judgment about the best course of action. This 
approach, however, seems better suited to adults with, amongst other things, experience, 
relatively stable and adaptive values, and, on occasions, some ability to decentre and see a 
decision from the point of view of those most affected by it. Children and young adults do not 
always have stable, adaptive values, beliefs and goals. If they were to rely entirely and 
blindly on their intuition, they could find themselves with decisions which inappropriately 
shaped their lives and which they later regretted. Perkins (2009), reflecting on young people’s 
decision-making, takes a different view. He suggests that some decisions are better taken by 
logic and others by intuition. For instance, where there are no vested interests, choosing 
amongst tentative solutions to a technological problem may be made a matter of logic (de 
Swardt, 1998). Deciding on a career, however, is likely to involve personal values, beliefs 
and goals, so it could be something for intuition. Putting aside young children’s ability to 
dichotomise situations in this way, situations may not be so conveniently divided into those 
for purely logical and those for purely intuitive decisions. Dichotomization could result in 
ignoring potentially useful information from either the intellectual or the emotional system.  
 
To add to the problem of developing competence in decision making, some teachers can be 
reluctant to discuss matters of values, beliefs and goals with students (e.g. Åstrand, 2014; 
Carnegie, 2003). Parents may also see this as threatening values they want to teach their 
children, and some cultures may interpret it as being against personal freedom and the aims 
of a liberal education (Patterson, 2015). Instead, some underpinning skills may be developed 
(such as methodical thought) and awareness raised (as of ‘national values’), but the parts may 
not be brought together and exercised (e.g. Veugelers (2000)). 
 
Taking all together, what could be the most important kind of purposeful thought, decision-
making, could have a difficult time in the classroom because teachers may be nervous about 
discussing personal values, they may lack a decision-making model to guide their teaching, 
and may be unaware of the potential role of the emotional system 
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5: Emotional design 
 
Introduction 
With these exemplars of purposeful thought, I set out to demonstrate that the interaction of 
moods, emotions and the intellect is likely, it can be helpful, and it can even make a useful 
contribution to the intellect’s efforts. Contrary to popular belief, the emotional system is not, 
itself, irrational, but takes as given personal values, beliefs and goals and applies them to 
situations accordingly. The information offered by the intellectual and emotional systems 
may not always be sound but it should not be ignored. That tendered by the emotional system 
can draw attention to those semi-conscious matters of consequence which need to be weighed 
for relevance and soundness. I suggest that a productive partnership between the intellectual 
and the emotion systems is possible in the classroom without threatening the integrity or 
quality of purposeful thought; it may, in fact, be possible to enhance its efficiency and 
effectiveness.  If Microsoft® can patent a system, however rudimentary, to detect a user’s 
emotional responses, and take action to ameliorate what it assumes are unwelcome effects 
(Lloyd, 2015), surely a teacher, with a reasonable amount of understanding, forethought, 
empathy and sensitivity, should be able to do better4. In this section, I describe a way of 
capturing the notion of making an emotion-intellect partnership productive and describe some 
strategies for establishing such a partnership. 
 
Emotional design  
Plass et al. (2013, pp. 2−3) were interested in maximizing the effect of multimedia teaching 
materials and saw the value of enlisting the emotional system to support the effect of their 
instructional design. Their materials presented information in ways which activated the 
emotions. For example, they used anthropomorphic, cartoon-like figures to depict processes. 
This provision of food for the intellect, combined with food for the emotions, they called 
emotional design. Although the notion applied to a specific context, I believe it is a term 
which deserves to be used more generally to describe the making of fruitful partnerships 
between the intellectual and emotional systems in the classroom. How might a teacher go 
about emotional design in this broader way? Looking first at the place where the teaching 
takes place: few teachers can design the room where they teach, or choose its furniture, but 
they may be able to organize it formally or informally and set up displays which favour 
particular emotional climates (McGee & Fraser, 2011; Reyes, et al., 2012). 
 
Forethought is next. When teachers plan to exercise purposeful thought, they correctly give 
attention to exercising the intellect. But, this forethought needs to be shaped by consideration 
of what will foster student engagement. For instance, learning activities need to offer some 
satisfaction of students’ goals and psychological needs. It may be tempting to rely on the 
                                                          
4 Returning briefly to the fostering of an across-the-board disposition towards critical thinking (Halpern, 1998), 
good thinking (Harpaz, 2005), or constructive doubt (Bertrand Russell, in Hare (2001)), perhaps students 
themselves should learn to reflect on the effects of moods and emotions and the information they might offer.  
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practical utility of the learning but much that must be acquired in formal education does not 
have an immediate or obvious use. An excessive reliance on utility can make motivation 
more difficult when students must engage with activities that simply pave the way to other 
thoughts. Of course, engagement with a task is not always immediately fruitful: interest does 
not guarantee productive methodical or constructive thought or decision-making. Tugade and 
Fredrickson (2007) have also pointed to the value of resilience – an ability to recover from 
negative emotional experiences and re-engage with a task, perhaps in a different way. To that 
end, they recommend cultivating positive emotions or, at least, reducing those that are 
negative.  
 
Planning also involves anticipating negative responses to public performance and providing 
ways of engaging students in, say, practising a second language without gratuitous exposure 
to public scrutiny. For instance, there are some indications that using digital technologies 
which allow students to talk freely on their own can help (Evans, 2009).  It is not, however, 
desirable to shield students entirely from public performance, but that exposure needs to be 
managed, perhaps by slowly increasing it in an attempt to develop some emotional immunity 
to it. This applies equally to high-stake tests which are often unavoidable. There are also 
implications for teachers’ behaviours, some of which may produce unproductive moods and 
emotions in students. Humour can have a place in altering the emotional climate (and in 
making an intellectual point) but it can be overdone. Students may find maintaining a state of 
hilarity to be more attractive than the task in hand. Some teachers feel a need to control 
events so closely that the emotional climate discourages a free exploration of ideas. For 
instance, a teacher may unconsciously develop unsympathetic class management practices, 
and then need great self-control to break the habit when the emotional climate needs to be 
more amicable (Galinsky, 2010). 
 
Forethought also needs to consider the emotions which could support productive thought 
during an activity (and also students’ maladaptive emotions which are likely to hinder that 
thought). Emotional design entails thought about how favourable moods and emotions will be 
encouraged, and those that are unfavourable will be discouraged. At its simplest, a teacher 
might nudge moods in the desired direction through choice of activity, behaviour, and the 
nature of interpersonal relationships. Figure 5.1 depicts a theoretically supportive stream of 
affect in some hypothetical teaching session which calls for some creative thought.  
 
                      +                            B 
                                A                                             C              D                
             Neutral                     
 
           _ 
   
Figure 5.1: A desired stream of affect, progressing from left (start) to right (conclusion) in a lesson. 
The solid line is the desired stream of affect; the broken line is the track of the prevailing, emotional, 
classroom climate.  
 
During A, the students are given their instructions, for which a fairly neutral mood may be 
seen as appropriate. During B, a period when the students are to be constructive, a lighter, 
more positive mood may be useful. After this, an evaluation of ideas is expected (C). This 
more methodical thought is expected to benefit from a neutral, calm, and even slightly low 
mood. To conclude, the students must collect and present their ideas (D), for which a more 
cheerful mood may be seen as appropriate, and also one with which to end the session. 
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Students, of course, do not arrive free of moods and emotions but bring them with them. (In 
this session, they arrive in a slightly negative frame of mind, indicated by the broken line 
which begins below the neutral point. From this initial state, their moods and emotions 
develop and change in response to the teacher, the topic, the task, the environment, and others 
students. In this instance, the teacher wishes to raise the mood to what is more conducive to 
creative thinking. During the introduction (A), the students are attracted by the teacher’s 
enthusiasm and feel quite positive about the task, which helps them think freely and 
constructively to generate ideas (B). But during C, the teacher calms the class and lowers the 
prevailing mood. During (D), the teacher raises the emotional climate by modelling and 
accepting a slightly more relaxed classroom atmosphere. People and contexts vary; teachers 
familiar with their students, the topic, and the context are likely to know when and what kind 
of emotional design is needed. When it is needed, what might they do? 
 
Influencing a stream of affect 
There are various ways of influencing a stream of affect, some being more feasible in 
teaching contexts than others. They may be divided into those that are applied by the teacher 
(external influence) and those used by some students to regulate their own moods and 
emotions as they perceive the need (internal influence). For example,  
 
 External influence  
o Potential actions taken by teachers 
There are behaviours which people adopt in social situations which experience has 
taught can make moods and emotions less negative. These include listening, 
sympathising, praising, joking, highlighting the positive side of events, and distracting 
attention from the source of the negative emotion. At least on a one-to-one basis, 
these probably have some useful effect (see, for instance, Goodwin & Judd, 2005). 
Similarly, behaviours which induce negative moods and emotions are those associated 
with criticising, ignoring, mocking, and being aggressive (Niven et al., 2007). 
Expressive behaviours, such as posture and facial expression, can also influence 
moods and emotions. For instance, a slumped posture may produce feelings of 
sadness; a taut posture with clenched fists may produce anger, while leaning back 
with face covered by the hands can lead to feelings of fear (e.g. Flack et al., 1999; 
Laird & Lacasse, 2014). Facial expressions and body language may be noted and 
understood in a quarter of a second (Martinez et al., 2015). Adjusting the pace, 
rhythm and pitch of the voice can also change moods and emotions (e.g. Hatfield et 
al., 1995). Adopting a more even, quieter and slower discourse, for instance, has a 
tendency to reduce the intensity of emotions and move them towards a more neutral 
level. Increasing the pace and injecting a note of excitement, on the other hand, 
indicates enthusiasm. (In excess, it can, of course, make a teacher look foolish and be 
the object of derision – not an emotion which most teachers would want to produce.) 
Emotions of other kinds can also spread through a classroom: teachers must be aware 
that they can influence the emotional climate unintentionally by their unconscious 
expression, posture and demeanour. (Students admired by their peers can similarly 
influence the emotional climate, but not always in the desired direction (Delvaux et al, 
2016)). Of course, the need for a particular frame of mind need not be a secret. 
Informing students of the value of an appropriate mood or emotion at the time when it 
is needed could be a useful lesson in itself.  
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o Potential actions taken by researchers 
Researchers who investigate the effects of particular emotions need to induce them as 
needed. For instance, sometimes they offer small gifts to generate a positive mood. 
They may also induce moods using cartoons and film clips showing happy or sad 
events. Even having people imagine such events in their lives can alter the existing 
mood. Social interaction and distraction through a change of activity can break the 
hold of an existing mood (e.g. Dosseville et al., 2012). Note, however, that there can 
be gender differences in susceptibility to particular strategies. Men, for instance, tend 
to prefer (and choose) distraction and activities they find pleasurable to change sad 
moods and alleviate boredom; women have shown a preference for social activities as 
a way of changing moods (Thayer et al., 1994). Actions, whether by the teacher or 
researcher, are likely to be more effective if used in combination (Thayer et al., 1994). 
Those who are seriously emotionally disturbed, however, are better cared for by the 
professional medical services (Wagner, 1995). Any intense moods or emotions that 
have been induced should be effectively reduced in participants before they leave the 
investigation.  
 
 Internal influence 
o Potential actions taken by students 
Ideally, students would take actions which adjust their own moods and emotions to suit 
the situation. In addition, people often have personal coping strategies which moderate 
strong emotions and unpleasant feelings (for example, counting to ten when angry) 
(Pekrun et al., 2002). Young children may be helped to practise such strategies through 
role play (Lillard et al., 2012). Teachers and counsellors may be able to teach students 
how to adjust their moods, particularly when these impede thinking and learning. For 
instance, children of about 11 years of age were taught ‘optimistic thinking skills’ and 
saw them used by their teacher and practised them. There is evidence that the 
programme improved their ability to cope with problems (Cunningham et al., 2002). 
Physical exercise has been found to make moods more positive (Hogan et al., 2013; 
Kubesch et al., 2009) but note that exercise can also make students respond more 
strongly to positive and negative feedback (Turnbull & Wolfson, 2002). Relaxation 
techniques, meditation and mindfulness training can lessen feelings of anxiety and 
stress (Chen et al., 2012; Garland et al., 2015). Mindfulness is a state in which attention 
is continuously focused on the present moment. It can promote well-being in young and 
old, and it can be taught (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Mendelson et al., 2010; Napoli et al., 
2005). This can be of particular relevance when working with ‘mature’ students, those 
who return to education after some years in the workplace. Mature students tend to 
worry about how they compare with their younger classmates and are not always 
satisfied with less than perfect grades (Hanson, 1996). How students can be formally 
taught to regulate their moods and emotions and, hence, improve their academic 
success needs further investigation (Zeidner et al., 2002), but the advantages of self-
regulation are self-evident: students would be able to manage their learning inside and 
outside the classroom, and develop an ability of lifelong value. It is possible to teach 
the skills. For example, an approach (aimed at improving the emotional climate of the 
classroom) included teacher training, student education and practice in self-managing 
moods and emotions in lessons, and was found to be effective (Rivers et al., 2013). This 
seems open to adaptation to include the interactions of moods and emotions with 
thinking. Of course, many factors other than moods and emotions can bear upon the 
endeavours of the intellect: lack of sleep, illness, and diet are examples. At the same 
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time, these can also affect moods and emotions; the loss of two or three hours sleep, for 
instance, can make mood and emotion more difficult to manage (Baum et al., 2014). 
 
How to influence a stream of affect in acceptable ways in the classroom is a subject which 
could benefit from further study by both pedagogical researchers and classroom practitioners. 
 
Teaching students to use the information which emotions offer 
In personal decision-making, the emotions do not simply support or hinder purposeful 
thought, they signal when situations and options are perceived to threaten or benefit what 
matters to us. In other words, they offer information which is potentially useful for making a 
decision. But it must be remembered that this information comes from perceptions of 
situations and options and an uncritical acceptance of what we currently believe matters. 
What emotions have to say (popularly, how someone ‘feels’ about things) may be well-
founded or not, but they do point to the existence of personal values, beliefs and goals which 
may be only partly conscious. Ignoring the proffered information could lead to poor decisions 
for the person concerned. The information should, at least, be interrogated for its relevance, 
foundations, and long-term worth. Similarly, the intellect’s response is also based on 
perceptions which may be inappropriate, biased, and without reference to personal values 
below the level of awareness. Thagard (2001) leans towards an ‘informed reliance’ on the 
emotions for decision-making, which seems better suited to adults with experience and 
relatively stable values and goals. Perkins (2009) prefers dichotomising decisions into those 
for the intellect and those for the emotions when many important decisions could benefit 
from the application of both. Neither approach seems to give sufficient attention to the 
unconscious and possibly ill-founded assumptions and values of relatively inexperienced 
young people. Papastephanou and Angeli (2007) argue that a tendency for young people to 
develop a reflective disposition in decision-making is what is needed.  
 
Accordingly, a middle way which acknowledges that both mental systems may have 
something useful to offer seems better, provided that what they have to say is interrogated.  
A model which may be useful for educators is offered in figure 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: A cyclical and iterative model for guiding teaching and practising decision-making. 
 
This involves: 
EXPLORE: A process of clarifying the nature and purpose of the decision, its criteria and 
constraints. After an initial clarification, successive cycles around the loop contribute to 
options and their attributes. In practical terms, it can be supported by organising and 
relating the information in a mind map. 
 
influences 
consequences 
options 
 
 
 
influences 
consequences 
options 
 
 
 
 EXPLORE 
THINK OF FEEL ABOUT 
CHOOSE TEST TRY 
WHAT IF? 
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THINK OF: The process of constructing or identifying options, their consequences and 
likelihoods, looking for unwarranted biases and tendencies (like thoughtlessly doing what 
others do), and consequences for others, trying to see an option from another’s point of 
view (strong anxiety can make this difficult (Todd et al., 2015)).The intellectual system 
here serves as a tool to point to logical choices which meet the criteria or constraints.   
 
FEEL ABOUT: The process in which emotions generated by the options and their 
consequences are considered. The emotional system here serves as a tool to indicate 
threats to and benefits for matters of personal consequence. These are reflected upon to 
determine their sources, relevance, and suitability.  
 
The cycle represents an iterative process involving these three elements and continues 
until it ceases to be productive, then it moves on to:  
 
CHOOSE: The selection of an option which is reasonable and feels right and can be 
justified. If there is no such option, the cycle has to be re-entered to find others. Doing 
nothing can be an appropriate option. Speed is not a criterion for success (Bogacz et al., 
2006). 
 
WHAT IF? The world is an uncertain place so, if the decision shows signs of being the 
wrong one, what can be done about it? Can the decision be rescinded and another course 
of action taken? What would that be? Courses of action may be open to change as 
situations develop but some are irrevocable (Etzioni, 1989).  
 
TEST: A process of having the decision judged by someone else, if this is feasible or 
appropriate. The choice is described to someone who may point out something which has 
been overlooked. Ideally, this person should know that the ‘best’ decision depends on the 
person. It may lead to the decision being re-considered.   
 
TRY: Putting the decision into effect. The success or otherwise of the outcome may 
inform future decisions or the decision-making process.  
 
This model should not, however, become a thoughtless routine for decision-making. There 
should be due reflection on bias, assumptions and values, particularly in the cyclical stage5. 
 
Monitoring progress in thinking 
I should conclude this part with a somewhat commonplace way in which the emotional 
system offers information: it responds to progress in purposeful thought with emotions, some 
quite strong. If progress is good and offers promise of success, the emotion can be a rising 
                                                          
5 The ability of teachers and students to manage the interaction between emotions and the intellect may bring to 
mind ‘emotional intelligence’ (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), a notion which has attracted various meanings, 
sometimes controversial. For instance, it can be an ability to recognise and regulate one’s emotions (e.g. Mayer 
& Cobb, 2000; Mayer et al., 2008; Zeidner et al., 2012), or the acquisition and application of information from 
those emotions (e.g. Yadav, 2011). Another capacity, ‘emotional reflexivity’ (Holmes, 2015), is a response to 
the interpretation of feelings when interacting with others. Developing such abilities has the potential to be 
useful. In some circumstance, teachers’ emotional intelligence and their teaching effectiveness go hand in hand 
(Hassan et al., 2015) – with, of course, the caveat that these terms can mean different things to different people. 
This account of emotion-cognition interactions in purposeful thought is largely directed at illustrating specific 
effects and how to use them to advantage in the classroom. While these may contribute to some kind of 
emotional intelligence or reflexivity, it depends on how these terms are defined. 
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excitement, increased enthusiasm, and intense, continued engagement. Perceived success (not 
necessarily what the teacher would judge to be success) can produce pleasure and even 
exhilaration. When progress stalls and thinking is unproductive, the emotion can be 
frustration and annoyance. This may prompt some students to increase their effort, and some 
may persist beyond what is reasonable then join those who simply abandon the task. The 
students need to be taught that these emotions are telling them that they seem to be having 
little success with their chosen approach. Instead of giving up, they need to heed the message 
and seek another approach (or have the one they are using checked). 
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6: In conclusion 
 
Summing up 
This account of the interplay between the emotional system and the intellectual system was to 
illustrate that the emotional system can motivate and prompt mental engagement with the 
topic in hand, but can also overwhelm purposeful thought when emotions are strong. It was 
also to show that the emotional system can support certain kinds of purposeful thought 
commonly expected in formal education while impeding others. Thus, methodical thought 
can benefit from a calm, even slightly sad mood. That which needs constructive thought and 
imagination can profit from a less focused, wider ranging frame of mind, such as that 
associated with feeling cheerful. Beyond merely supporting or hindering purposeful thought, 
the emotional system can also be an integral and essential part of it, as when it judges choices 
in decision-making, and offers information about progress towards a thinking goal. It has also 
been suggested that taking these effects into account in the various aspects of teaching – a 
process of emotional design – could enhance the quality and efficiency of purposeful thought. 
Indeed, there are times when commonly recommended teaching practices can be counter-
productive when moods and emotions are ignored. The notion of emotional design was 
offered, and some ways of managing the classroom’s emotional climate were described, but, 
as always, further research could be helpful. 
 
While I believe these exemplars are sufficient to make the point and are very relevant to 
educational practice, what they illustrate does not exhaust known and particular interactions 
of the two systems. Reasoning, understanding, creative thinking, evaluation, and decision-
making are relatively large-scale constructs, but they can involve other processes open to the 
influence of moods and emotions. For instance, emotionally laden material in general tends to 
attract attention (see, e.g., Anderson, 2005), but those in a happy frame of mind attend to 
general or global aspects of the information, while those who are sad or anxious tend to focus 
on details (Becker & Leinenger, 2011; Wegbreit et al., 2014) (a common analogy is that of 
drawing parallels with ‘seeing the forest’ and ‘seeing the trees’ which make up that forest 
(Gasper & Clore, 2002)). Moods and emotions associated with events can also make them 
easier to recall as memory tends to favour emotive material (Laney et al., 2003). This can be 
very useful; emotive events involve matters of personal consequence so storing them for 
future reference can be adaptive (Ferré, 2003; Lindström & Bohlin, 2011). What is stored, 
however, depends on the intensity of the emotion. Events which produce relatively weak 
emotions result in attention being spread across both central and peripheral information. 
Events which produce strong emotions focus attention on central matters (Heath & Erickson, 
1998). Memory is a selective process, partly shaped by emotions. There is, for instance, a 
tendency for information associated with negative emotions to become less accessible (the 
‘good old days’ effect) (Walker et al., 2003). While emotive events are recalled more readily 
than others, they also tend to be given a greater significance than they deserve, particularly 
when they are associated with strong negative emotions (Miron-Shatz et al., 2009). Emotions 
attached to events can also give rise to false memories (Kaplan et al., 2015), and recall itself 
may be subject to prevailing moods. Pioneering work by Bower (1981), refined later by 
others (see, e.g. Barry et al., 2004), found a modest tendency for a mood congruence effect in 
which there is better recall when the current mood is like the one attached to the event. Also 
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of relevance in learning is the effect of emotion on recalling something which ought to be 
done. Somewhat anxious and depressed people are more likely to forget to do it (Kliegel et al. 
2005). Prior knowledge and experience contribute significantly to purposeful thought, but 
this contribution is, itself, subject to the influence of moods and emotions. Nor does this 
entirely exhaust the interactions of emotions and the intellect. Moral judgment is another 
example. While some may attempt to base morality on reason, it is more often a matter of an 
emotional response to, ‘How do I feel about it?’ which we justify later with reason (Haidt, 
2001). Perhaps less noticed is the effect of emotions like disgust on the severity of someone’s 
judgment of actions: the more disgust is felt, the harsher the judgment is likely to be (Schnall, 
2011). The list of interactions is long but their nature is not always unexpected.  
 
It probably hardly needs to be mentioned that the magnitude of an interaction depends on the 
person: some respond to perceived threats and benefits more strongly than others. Individual 
differences in how readily emotional responses are aroused, in self-regulation, and in 
experience seem to come from differences in genetic make-up and learning; that is, it is a 
nature-nurture combination (Eisenberg et al. 2010; Rothbart, 2012). Differences in culture 
can also produce different emotional responses to the same event (see e.g. Leersnyder et al., 
2015). Furthermore, Jackson (2010) has pointed to an emotional tension between academic 
and social success. A student may value both but give priority to one. In some cultures, being 
academically successful can lead to social isolation. It can be still more complex. For 
instance, being collectively creative is more socially acceptable than displaying individual 
creativity in some cultures, while being academically successful risks being labelled, 
disparagingly, as a ‘nerd’ or ‘geek’ in some Western cultures (Bishop et al., 2004).  
 
In all this concern for students’ productive thought, we should not forget that the teacher is 
also intimately involved in the emotional enterprise of education and is potentially subject to 
the same effects. Teachers are not machines and must manage their own emotional responses 
as they try to maximise the students’ quality of thought (for an overview of teachers’ 
emotional responses, see, e.g. Uitto et al., 2015).  
 
Putting the elephant in the classroom to work 
Most teachers know that moods and emotions affect behaviour. For too long, their effects on 
thinking and learning in the classroom have been treated as unwelcome guests, to be ignored, 
suppressed, or dealt with without forethought. This does not mean that irrational thought is to 
be encouraged but that the emotional system is not inherently or necessarily irrational, 
although what it works with could be so, just as with the intellectual system. Instead, I 
suggest that the emotional system, with care, could be put to good use to oil the works of the 
intellectual system, and also offer potentially useful information to work with. Nevertheless, 
like all mental products, whatever their source, what these two minds have to say should be 
considered carefully. Most teachers are not insensitive to emotional responses and classroom 
climates (Hargreaves, 2000) but they may need to reflect more on the role of moods and 
emotions in their teaching, and build the potential for interaction with the intellect into their 
plans for exercising purposeful thought. To that end, their training needs to give them a 
vocabulary to think with and to discuss emotion-intellect interactions. It should also allow 
them to practise emotional design.  
 
Nevertheless, I do not suggest that all pedagogical thought is now turned exclusively to 
emotions. Some research, however, needs to go beyond the finding of effective strategies to 
exercise the intellect alone, and should identify efficient, emotion cum intellect strategies for 
teachers to use. But educators should not think that emotions always have to be changed to 
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suit teaching needs. It is important for a teacher to be reasonable about what is and is not 
managed: not every mood and emotion needs to be ‘adjusted’. Depending on what is to be 
taught, the prevailing emotional climate may be sufficient to meet the needs of the situation. 
The moods and emotions we would probably be particularly concerned about are those which 
put a low ceiling on academic success when, with a little forethought, they might be used to 
raise that ceiling. Some wise words of Larsen (2000, p. 140) make the point eloquently: ‘I am 
not of the view that affective states should be regulated out of existence or that people should 
not have moods. We want people to have moods, but we don’t necessarily want moods to 
have people’.  
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